Mark J. Roe:Starke Manager, schwache Eigentümer: Die politischen Wurzeln der amerikanischen Unternehmensfinanzierung
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The Nile on eBay FREE SHIPPING UK WIDE Strong Managers, Weak Owners by Mark J. Roe Demonstrates that the ownership structure of large U S firms owes its distinctive character as much to politics as to economics and technology. This title addresses issues facing American businesses as they compete in the new international marketplace. FORMATPaperback LANGUAGEEnglish CONDITIONBrand New Publisher Description The distinctive character of corporate business enterprise in the United States - large firms guided by powerful, centralized managers, historically deferential directors, and distant shareholders - is usually thought to be the inevitable result of economic and technological forces. In this major reinterpretation of the origins and evolution of corporate structure, Mark Roe shows that the nature of the American corporation derives not only from these forces but also from political decisions that made alternative forms of organization costly or illegal. Drawing upon work in economics, history, law, and political science, Roe argues that the role of politicians in mediating the interaction between firms and financiers is a critical, but neglected, part of the explanation why certain forms rather than others prevailed. In their classic 1932 study, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means argued that the separation of ownership and control was the consequence of industrial technologies requiring large-scale production, which in turn led to highly dispersed stockholding.Roe demonstrates, however, that the ownership structure of the American corporation represents just one of several possible outcomes, and that other organizational forms arose abroad (in Germany and Japan, for example) under the influence of different political conditions. At a number of critical junctures, political choices were made about how savings were to be channeled to industry that sharply restricted the power of financial institutions to shape the growth of large firms. These decisions, which pre-dated the New Deal, going as far back in some cases as the nineteenth century,reflected the American public's enduring dislike of concentrated financial power. Once these rules for the governance of financial institutions were in place - but not before - the Berle-Means corporation became inevitable. In recent years, new technological and competitive cha Notes No one before has ever written a comprehensive poltical history of the fragmentation of stock ownership nor demonstrated the critical role that this fragmentation has played in shaping the power of managers in the American business system. Roe has provided a powerful and original explanation of the emergence and persistence of managerial autonomy in the United States. -- David Vogel, University of California, Berkeley A seminal work that should become [a] mainstay for years to come. -- Peter H. Aranson, Emory University Back Cover "No one before has ever written a comprehensive poltical history of the fragmentation of stock ownership nor demonstrated the critical role that this fragmentation has played in shaping the power of managers in the American business system. Roe has provided a powerful and original explanation of the emergence and persistence of managerial autonomy in the United States." --David Vogel, University of California, Berkeley "A seminal work that should become [a] mainstay for years to come." --Peter H. Aranson, Emory University Author Biography Mark J. Roe is a professor at Columbia Law School. Table of Contents PrefaceIntroductionPt. IThe Economic Paradigm1Ch. 1Diffuse Ownership as Natural Economic Evolution3Ch. 2Fragmentation's Costs9Pt. IIThe Political Paradigm19Ch. 3Diffuse Ownership as Political Product21Ch. 4A Political Theory26Pt. IIIThe Historical Evidence51Ch. 5Banks54Ch. 6Insurers60Ch. 7Banks Again94Ch. 8Mutual Funds102Ch. 9Pension Funds124Pt. IVThe Contemporary and Comparative Evidence147Ch. 10Takeovers151Ch. 11Corporate Ownership in Germany and Japan169Ch. 12A Small Comparative Test of the Political Theory187Ch. 13Counterpoint I198Ch. 14Political Evolution in Germany and Japan?210Ch. 15Trends in the United States222Ch. 16An American Crossroads226Pt. VPolicy Recommendations231Ch. 17Managers as the Problem?235Ch. 18Short-Term Finance as the Problem?240Ch. 19Industrial Organization as the Problem?248Ch. 20Counterpoint II254Ch. 21Changing the American Ownership Structure?263Conclusion283Bibliography289Acknowledgments309Index311 Review "Economic theory appeared to predict that the American version [of capitalism, in which firms feed on a huge and liquid stockmarket] should be the most efficient. This view stemmed from [Berle and Means] in The Modern Corporation and Private Property ... [and] held sway for the next fifty years... Roe ... takes this debate a giant step forward. Far from being the inevitable winner of a Darwinian struggle, argues Roe, the Berle-Means corporation owes its existence to American politics, and in particular to a deeply ingrained popular mistrust of concentrated financial power."--The Economist "Roe ... argues persuasively that old-fashioned politics ... play[s] the key role in building a structure of corporate finance... Strong Managers, Weak Owners does for corporate governance what Alfred Chandler's The Visible Hand did for the corporation: makes history essential to understanding current practice and policy."--Robert Teitelman, Institutional Investor Promotional No one before has ever written a comprehensive poltical history of the fragmentation of stock ownership nor demonstrated the critical role that this fragmentation has played in shaping the power of managers in the American business system. Roe has provided a powerful and original explanation of the emergence and persistence of managerial autonomy in the United States. -- David Vogel, University of California, Berkeley A seminal work that should become [a] mainstay for years to come. -- Peter H. Aranson, Emory University Long Description The distinctive character of corporate business enterprise in the United States - large firms guided by powerful, centralized managers, historically deferential directors, and distant shareholders - is usually thought to be the inevitable result of economic and technological forces. In this major reinterpretation of the origins and evolution of corporate structure, Mark Roe shows that the nature of the American corporation derives not only from these forces but also from political decisions that made alternative forms of organization costly or illegal. Drawing upon work in economics, history, law, and political science, Roe argues that the role of politicians in mediating the interaction between firms and financiers is a critical, but neglected, part of the explanation why certain forms rather than others prevailed. In their classic 1932 study, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means argued that the separation of ownership and control was the consequence of industrial technologies requiring large-scale production, which in turn led to highly dispersed stockholding.Roe demonstrates, however, that the ownership structure of the American corporation represents just one of several possible outcomes, and that other organizational forms arose abroad (in Germany and Japan, for example) under the influence of different political conditions. At a number of critical junctures, political choices were made about how savings were to be channeled to industry that sharply restricted the power of financial institutions to shape the growth of large firms. These decisions, which pre-dated the New Deal, going as far back in some cases as the nineteenth century,reflected the American public's enduring dislike of concentrated financial power. Once these rules for the governance of financial institutions were in place - but not before - the Berle-Means corporation became inevitable. In recent years, new technological and competitive cha Review Quote Roe ... argues persuasively that old-fashioned politics ... play[s] the key role in building a structure of corporate finance....Strong Managers, Weak Ownersdoes for corporate governance what Alfred Chandler'sThe Visible Handdid for the corporation: makes history essential to understanding current practice and policy. -- Robert Teitelman, Institutional Investor Details ISBN0691026319 Author Mark J. Roe Short Title STRONG MANAGERS WEAK OWNERS Publisher Princeton University Press Language English ISBN-10 0691026319 ISBN-13 9780691026312 Media Book Format Paperback DEWEY 658.15 Year 1996 Imprint Princeton University Press Subtitle The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance Place of Publication New Jersey Country of Publication United States Illustrations black & white illustrations Residence US Birth 1951 Translated from English DOI 10.1604/9780691026312 UK Release Date 1996-03-24 NZ Release Date 1996-03-24 US Release Date 1996-03-24 Pages 342 Publication Date 1996-03-24 Alternative 9780691036830 Audience Professional & Vocational AU Release Date 1996-06-03 We've got thisAt The Nile, if you're looking for it, we've got it.With fast shipping, low prices, friendly service and well over a million items - you're bound to find what you want, at a price you'll love! 30 DAY RETURN POLICYNo questions asked, 30 day returns! FREE DELIVERYNo matter where you are in the UK, delivery is free. SECURE PAYMENTPeace of mind by paying through PayPal and eBay Buyer Protection TheNile_Item_ID:137817050; , Neu, Festpreisangebot, [LT: FixedPrice], ISBN-13: 9780691026312, Book Title: Strong Managers, Weak Owners, EAN: 9780691026312, Publication Year: 1996, Type: Textbook, Format: Paperback, Language: English, Publication Name: Strong Managers, Weak Owners: the Political Roots of American Corporate Finance, Item Height: 254mm, Item Width: 197mm, Subject: Economics, Item Weight: 482g, Princeton University Press<
