2007, ISBN: 1406771600, Lieferbar binnen 4-6 Wochen Custos de envio:Versandkostenfrei innerhalb der BRD

Internationaler Buchtitel. In englischer Sprache. Verlag: DODO PR, 200 Seiten, L=216mm, B=140mm, H=12mm, Gew.=259gr, [GR: 25500 - TB/Geschichte], [SW: - History - General History], Karto… mais…

Internationaler Buchtitel. In englischer Sprache. Verlag: DODO PR, 200 Seiten, L=216mm, B=140mm, H=12mm, Gew.=259gr, [GR: 25500 - TB/Geschichte], [SW: - History - General History], Kartoniert/Broschiert, Klappentext: STATESMEN AND SOLDIERS OF THE CIVIL WAR PREFACE THESE studies of. the relations which existed be tween statesmen and soldiers during the course of a prolonged war were delivered as the Lees-Knowles Lectures for 192.5-2.6 at Trinity College, Cambridge. The idea from which these lectures originated had its germ in a conversation with Lord Kitchener in 1915. Not long after I had joined the headquarters of our Army in France, Lord Kitchener paid his first visit to Sir John Frenchs G. H. Q., then at St. Omer. Early on the morning after Lord Kitcheners arrival I was walking up to the General Staff Office when I saw a tall figure, conspicuous in the blue undress uniform of a field marshal the rest of us were all in khaki, coming up the hill from Sir John Frenchs house. I stopped and saluted. Ah, said Lord Kitchener, I was just coming up to sec how you run your office. Well, sir, we try to make it as little like the War Office as possible. An admirable ideal how do you do it The practice in the War Office used to be, when a question came up, to collect the largest possible number of opinions about it from everyone who had even the remotest concern - with the question, before any attempt was made to arrive at a decision. Here we try to get the question straight to the man who can decide and to get him to do so. vi PREFACE Ah, came the answer, if only we had thought of organizing our Government for war I knew then nothing of the discussions and con troversies which had arisen around the inception of the Dardanelles campaign. But later, when I came in contact with the various attempts made to organize our Government for war, and later still when I read the reports of the Commissions of En quiryinto the Dardanelles and Mesopotamia cam paigns, I often recalled Lord Kitcheners words. Before the war I had thought and read about the organization of armies for war, never about the organization of Governments. During the war, when I was asked to think of this, thought was necessarily hurried. Since the war there has been more time for study and reflection and the invitation to give the Lees-Knowles Lectures gave me an oc casion for putting the results of reflection into shape. My historical studies are therefore frankly and unashamedly objective. I had long been dissatis fied that the judgments of Lord Wolseley and of Colonel F. R. Henderson upon Lincolns conduct of the war, written by the former on incomplete in formation, and by the latter in a study of one part only of the American Civil War, should stand as the British military criticism of a great statesman. When I studied again, in the light of my own ex perience in the Great War, the relations between Lincoln and McClellan and between Lincoln and Grant I became more than ever convinced that if, PREFACE vii instead of holding up Lincolns actions in May 1862. as an example of how not to interfere with soldiers, we had made a closer study of the work ings of his mind and of the processes by which he evolved a system for the conduct of war, we should have saved ourselves much painful labor in the Great War. That is one reason why I chose the story of the American Civil War as a platform from which to expound my theories the other I give in the first lecture. The lectures are presented as they were delivered with a few minor alterations and with the addition of the notes and references and some rearrangement of the last two . 19x5F. MAURICE CONTENTS PAGE PREFACE v I JEFFERSON DAVIS AND J. E. JOHNSTON. ..... STATESMEN AND SOLDIERS OF THE CIVIL WAR PREFACE THESE studies of. the relations which existed be tween statesmen and soldiers during the course of a prolonged war were delivered as the Lees-Knowles Lectures for 192.5-2.6 at Trinity College, Cambridge. The idea from which these lectures originated had its germ in a conversation with Lord Kitchener in 1915. Not long after I had joined the headquarters of our Army in France, Lord Kitchener paid his first visit to Sir John Frenchs G. H. Q., then at St. Omer. Early on the morning after Lord Kitcheners arrival I was walking up to the General Staff Office when I saw a tall figure, conspicuous in the blue undress uniform of a field marshal the rest of us were all in khaki, coming up the hill from Sir John Frenchs house. I stopped and saluted. Ah, said Lord Kitchener, I was just coming up to sec how you run your office. Well, sir, we try to make it as little like the War Office as possible. An admirable ideal how do you do it The practice in the War Office used to be, when a question came up, to collect the largest possible number of opinions about it from everyone who had even the remotest concern - with the question, before any attempt was made to arrive at a decision. Here we try to get the question straight to the man who can decide and to get him to do so. vi PREFACE Ah, came the answer, if only we had thought of organizing our Government for war I knew then nothing of the discussions and con troversies which had arisen around the inception of the Dardanelles campaign. But later, when I came in contact with the various attempts made to organize our Government for war, and later still when I read the reports of the Commissions of En quiryinto the Dardanelles and Mesopotamia cam paigns, I often recalled Lord Kitcheners words. Before the war I had thought and read about the organization of armies for war, never about the organization of Governments. During the war, when I was asked to think of this, thought was necessarily hurried. Since the war there has been more time for study and reflection and the invitation to give the Lees-Knowles Lectures gave me an oc casion for putting the results of reflection into shape. My historical studies are therefore frankly and unashamedly objective. I had long been dissatis fied that the judgments of Lord Wolseley and of Colonel F. R. Henderson upon Lincolns conduct of the war, written by the former on incomplete in formation, and by the latter in a study of one part only of the American Civil War, should stand as the British military criticism of a great statesman. When I studied again, in the light of my own ex perience in the Great War, the relations between Lincoln and McClellan and between Lincoln and Grant I became more than ever convinced that if, PREFACE vii instead of holding up Lincolns actions in May 1862. as an example of how not to interfere with soldiers, we had made a closer study of the work ings of his mind and of the processes by which he evolved a system for the conduct of war, we should have saved ourselves much painful labor in the Great War. That is one reason why I chose the story of the American Civil War as a platform from which to expound my theories the other I give in the first lecture. The lectures are presented as they were delivered with a few minor alterations and with the addition of the notes and references and some rearrangement of the last two . 19x5F. MAURICE CONTENTS PAGE PREFACE v I JEFFERSON DAVIS AND J. E. JOHNSTON. .....<

1915, ISBN: 1406771600

[EAN: 9781406771602], Neubuch, [PU: Frazer Press], BRAND NEW PRINT ON DEMAND., Statesmen and Soldiers of the Civil War - A Study of the Conduct of War, Major General Sir Frederik Maurice,… mais…

[EAN: 9781406771602], Neubuch, [PU: Frazer Press], BRAND NEW PRINT ON DEMAND., Statesmen and Soldiers of the Civil War - A Study of the Conduct of War, Major General Sir Frederik Maurice, STATESMEN AND SOLDIERS OF THE CIVIL WAR PREFACE THESE studies of. the relations which existed be tween statesmen and soldiers during the course of a prolonged war were delivered as the Lees-Knowles Lectures for 192.5-2.6 at Trinity College, Cambridge. The idea from which these lectures originated had its germ in a conversation with Lord Kitchener in 1915. Not long after I had joined the headquarters of our Army in France, Lord Kitchener paid his first visit to Sir John Frenchs G. H. Q., then at St. Omer. Early on the morning after Lord Kitcheners arrival I was walking up to the General Staff Office when I saw a tall figure, conspicuous in the blue undress uniform of a field marshal the rest of us were all in khaki, coming up the hill from Sir John Frenchs house. I stopped and saluted. Ah, said Lord Kitchener, I was just coming up to sec how you run your office. Well, sir, we try to make it as little like the War Office as possible. An admirable ideal how do you do it The practice in the War Office used to be, when a question came up, to collect the largest possible number of opinions about it from everyone who had even the remotest concern - with the question, before any attempt was made to arrive at a decision. Here we try to get the question straight to the man who can decide and to get him to do so. vi PREFACE Ah, came the answer, if only we had thought of organizing our Government for war I knew then nothing of the discussions and con troversies which had arisen around the inception of the Dardanelles campaign. But later, when I came in contact with the various attempts made to organize our Government for war, and later still when I read the reports of the Commissions of En quiryinto the Dardanelles and Mesopotamia cam paigns, I often recalled Lord Kitcheners words. Before the war I had thought and read about the organization of armies for war, never about the organization of Governments. During the war, when I was asked to think of this, thought was necessarily hurried. Since the war there has been more time for study and reflection and the invitation to give the Lees-Knowles Lectures gave me an oc casion for putting the results of reflection into shape. My historical studies are therefore frankly and unashamedly objective. I had long been dissatis fied that the judgments of Lord Wolseley and of Colonel F. R. Henderson upon Lincolns conduct of the war, written by the former on incomplete in formation, and by the latter in a study of one part only of the American Civil War, should stand as the British military criticism of a great statesman. When I studied again, in the light of my own ex perience in the Great War, the relations between Lincoln and McClellan and between Lincoln and Grant I became more than ever convinced that if, PREFACE vii instead of holding up Lincolns actions in May 1862. as an example of how not to interfere with soldiers, we had made a closer study of the work ings of his mind and of the processes by which he evolved a system for the conduct of war, we should have saved ourselves much painful labor in the Great War. That is one reason why I chose the story of the American Civil War as a platform from which to expound my theories the other I give in the first lecture. The lectures are presented as they were delivered with a few minor alterations and with the addition of the notes and references and some rearrangement of the last two . 19x5F. MAURICE CONTENTS PAGE PREFACE v I JEFFERSON DAVIS AND J. E. JOHNSTON. .<

ISBN: 1406771600

[EAN: 9781406771602], Neubuch, [PU: Frazer Press], BRAND NEW PRINT ON DEMAND., Statesmen and Soldiers of the Civil War - A Study of the Conduct of War, Major General Sir Frederik Maurice,… mais…

[EAN: 9781406771602], Neubuch, [PU: Frazer Press], BRAND NEW PRINT ON DEMAND., Statesmen and Soldiers of the Civil War - A Study of the Conduct of War, Major General Sir Frederik Maurice, STATESMEN AND SOLDIERS OF THE CIVIL WAR PREFACE THESE studies of. the relations which existed be tween statesmen and soldiers during the course of a prolonged war were delivered as the Lees-Knowles Lectures for 192.5-2.6 at Trinity College, Cambridge. The idea from which these lectures originated had its germ in a conversation with Lord Kitchener in 1915. Not long after I had joined the headquarters of our Army in France, Lord Kitchener paid his first visit to Sir John Frenchs G. H. Q., then at St. Omer. Early on the morning after Lord Kitcheners arrival I was walking up to the General Staff Office when I saw a tall figure, conspicuous in the blue undress uniform of a field marshal the rest of us were all in khaki, coming up the hill from Sir John Frenchs house. I stopped and saluted. Ah, said Lord Kitchener, I was just coming up to sec how you run your office. Well, sir, we try to make it as little like the War Office as possible. An admirable ideal how do you do it The practice in the War Office used to be, when a question came up, to collect the largest possible number of opinions about it from everyone who had even the remotest concern - with the question, before any attempt was made to arrive at a decision. Here we try to get the question straight to the man who can decide and to get him to do so. vi PREFACE Ah, came the answer, if only we had thought of organizing our Government for war I knew then nothing of the discussions and con troversies which had arisen around the inception of the Dardanelles campaign. But later, when I came in contact with the various attempts made to organize our Government for war, and later still when I read the reports of the Commissions of En quiryinto the Dardanelles and Mesopotamia cam paigns, I often recalled Lord Kitcheners words. Before the war I had thought and read about the organization of armies for war, never about the organization of Governments. During the war, when I was asked to think of this, thought was necessarily hurried. Since the war there has been more time for study and reflection and the invitation to give the Lees-Knowles Lectures gave me an oc casion for putting the results of reflection into shape. My historical studies are therefore frankly and unashamedly objective. I had long been dissatis fied that the judgments of Lord Wolseley and of Colonel F. R. Henderson upon Lincolns conduct of the war, written by the former on incomplete in formation, and by the latter in a study of one part only of the American Civil War, should stand as the British military criticism of a great statesman. When I studied again, in the light of my own ex perience in the Great War, the relations between Lincoln and McClellan and between Lincoln and Grant I became more than ever convinced that if, PREFACE vii instead of holding up Lincolns actions in May 1862. as an example of how not to interfere with soldiers, we had made a closer study of the work ings of his mind and of the processes by which he evolved a system for the conduct of war, we should have saved ourselves much painful labor in the Great War. That is one reason why I chose the story of the American Civil War as a platform from which to expound my theories the other I give in the first lecture. The lectures are presented as they were delivered with a few minor alterations and with the addition of the notes and references and some rearrangement of the last two . 19x5F. MAURICE CONTENTS PAGE PREFACE v I JEFFERSON DAVIS AND J. E. JOHNSTON. .<

2007, ISBN: 1406771600

[EAN: 9781406771602], Neubuch, [PU: Read Books, United Kingdom], Brand New Book ***** Print on Demand *****.STATESMEN AND SOLDIERS OF THE CIVIL WAR PREFACE THESE studies of. the relations… mais…

[EAN: 9781406771602], Neubuch, [PU: Read Books, United Kingdom], Brand New Book ***** Print on Demand *****.STATESMEN AND SOLDIERS OF THE CIVIL WAR PREFACE THESE studies of. the relations which existed be tween statesmen and soldiers during the course of a prolonged war were delivered as the Lees-Knowles Lectures for 192.5-2.6 at Trinity College, Cambridge. The idea from which these lectures originated had its germ in a conversation with Lord Kitchener in 1915. Not long after I had joined the headquarters of our Army in France, Lord Kitchener paid his first visit to Sir John Frenchs G. H. Q., then at St. Omer. Early on the morning after Lord Kitcheners arrival I was walking up to the General Staff Office when I saw a tall figure, conspicuous in the blue undress uniform of a field marshal the rest of us were all in khaki, coming up the hill from Sir John Frenchs house. I stopped and saluted. Ah, said Lord Kitchener, I was just coming up to sec how you run your office. Well, sir, we try to make it as little like the War Office as possible. An admirable ideal how do you do it The practice in the War Office used to be, when a question came up, to collect the largest possible number of opinions about it from everyone who had even the remotest concern - with the question, before any attempt was made to arrive at a decision. Here we try to get the question straight to the man who can decide and to get him to do so. vi PREFACE Ah, came the answer, if only we had thought of organizing our Government for war I knew then nothing of the discussions and con troversies which had arisen around the inception of the Dardanelles campaign. But later, when I came in contact with the various attempts made to organize our Government for war, and later still when I read the reports of the Commissions of En quiryinto the Dardanelles and Mesopotamia cam paigns, I often recalled Lord Kitcheners words. Before the war I had thought and read about the organization of armies for war, never about the organization of Governments. During the war, when I was asked to think of this, thought was necessarily hurried. Since the war there has been more time for study and reflection and the invitation to give the Lees-Knowles Lectures gave me an oc casion for putting the results of reflection into shape. My historical studies are therefore frankly and unashamedly objective. I had long been dissatis fied that the judgments of Lord Wolseley and of Colonel F. R. Henderson upon Lincolns conduct of the war, written by the former on incomplete in formation, and by the latter in a study of one part only of the American Civil War, should stand as the British military criticism of a great statesman. When I studied again, in the light of my own ex perience in the Great War, the relations between Lincoln and McClellan and between Lincoln and Grant I became more than ever convinced that if, PREFACE vii instead of holding up Lincolns actions in May 1862. as an example of how not to interfere with soldiers, we had made a closer study of the work ings of his mind and of the processes by which he evolved a system for the conduct of war, we should have saved ourselves much painful labor in the Great War. That is one reason why I chose the story of the American Civil War as a platform from which to expound my theories the other I give in the first lecture. The lectures are presented as they were delivered with a few minor alterations and with the addition of the notes and references and some rearrangement of the last two . 19x5F. MAURICE CONTENTS PAGE PREFACE v I JEFFERSON DAVIS AND J. E. JOHNSTON. .<